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2025 Legislative Council General Election - Home

Polling Information

Know Your Ballot Paper

Election Committee Constituency Ballot Paper Design (Front side)
Front side
In portrait
Top left hand corner is cut
Bearing the candidate number
Must mark 40 choices, no more and no less
Please use the pen provided at the polling station to mark by filling in black the ovals opposite the names of the candidates of your choice
No need to fold
Election Committee Constituency Ballot Paper Design (Back side)
Back side
Bearing the code of ECC and the wording “DO NOT FOLD”


Ballot Paper Checking with Votes Counting Automation System

Ballot Paper Checking with Votes Counting Automation System (“BPCVS”)

To enhance counting efficiency for a more accurate and smoother counting process, the Registration and Electoral Office (“REO”) has commissioned a contractor to develop the BPCVS, whereby vote counting will be conducted in an automated mode with the aid of High Speed Scanners (“HSS”).

The BPCVS makes use of the HSS with Pattern and Image Analysis Technology for Ballot Recognition to read the choices marked on ballot papers. It also supports manual input of the choices of the questionable ballot papers determined to be valid by the Returning Officers (“ROs”).

The major components of the BPCVS include:

Component Functions
1.
Custom Programs of the BPCVS
("Custom Programs")
  • Installed in the computers of relevant functional units at the Central Counting Station for validating and automated counting of ballots.
  • Storage of data for the Election Committee Constituency (such as numbers of candidates, candidates’ names and numbers).
  • Integration and counting of all the valid votes on ballot papers recorded by HSS and inputted through VBIS, and store them into the central database.
  • Printing of vote counting related reports and counting results.
2.
HSS
  • Scanning of ballot papers to record the valid votes into the BPCVS in an automated mode.
  • Ballot papers rejected by HSS will be delivered to the Returning Officers (“ROs”) for consideration. ROs will decide whether the votes on questionable ballot papers are to be counted at the Questionable Ballot Paper Determination Table in the presence of the candidates and their agents who are present.
3.
VBIS
  • For questionable ballot papers determined by the ROs as valid will be input into the BPCVS manually.
  • To ensure the accuracy of data entered manually, each ballot paper will be inputted into the BPCVS by two counting staff respectively and the BPCVS will instantly compare the results of the two entries. In case of any discrepancies, the BPCVS will give a prompt message which requires the counting staff to verify the data entered. The data inputted will only be stored into the BPCVS after all discrepancies have been reconciled.

Operation mechanism and benefits of Pattern and Image Analysis Technology for Ballot Recognition

  • Pattern and Image Analysis Technology for Ballot Recognition empowers the BPCVS to analyse ballot images and read the marked choices on a ballot paper. After electors marked the designated areas on a ballot paper, the system can identify and input the data into the system effectively and accurately in an automated mode without the need of tedious and repetitive manual efforts. This not only reduces significantly the chance of making mistakes by manual input, but can also reduce operational costs.
  • On the counting of votes, HSS with Pattern and Image Analysis Technology can identify ballots, read the marked choices on the ballots, and convert them into digital data that computers can process. The Custom Programs of the BPCVS will count the votes on valid ballot papers, integrate the data, and store them into the central database.

Workflow for the use of High Speed Scanners at Central Counting Station

  • After the close of poll, polling staff will deliver the ballot boxes to the Central Counting Station.
  • After the opening of ballot box(es) by the RO, counting staff will enumerate the number of ballot papers for verifying with the ballot paper accounts.
  • To ensure the secrecy of votes, ballot papers from different polling stations will be mixed and then undergo simple visual screening before they are to be counted.
  • HSSs will be used to validate the ballot papers and count the votes on the valid ones.
  • For questionable ballot papers separated during visual screening or scanning, they will be passed to the ROs for determination whether they are valid. Candidates and their election or counting agents may make representations during the determination process but the decision of the ROs on the ballot papers is final.
  • The valid votes marked on each ballot paper determined as valid by ROs will be input into the BPCVS manually through VBIS. Counting staff will work in pairs to perform double data entry to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the inputting process.
  • Once the RO confirms that all vote-counting has been completed, the Counting Zone Command Centre will consolidate the counting result through the BPCVS.
  • Votes captured by the HSSs and the VBIS will be consolidated through local area network by the BPCVS to form the counting results.

Independent quality assurance services

As in past elections, the REO will ensure that the 2025 Legislative Council General Election is conducted openly, fairly and honestly. Considering that the BPCVS is the vital part of the Election, the REO has commissioned four independent quality assurance services to ensure the integrity and reliability of the BPCVS:

  1. Privacy Impact Assessment
    • To evaluate whether the system has potential privacy issues and provide improvement recommendations when necessary.
  2. Independent Testing Services
    • To conduct comprehensive testing on the programs of the BPCVS, including function testing, system integration testing, and load/stress testing, etc.
  3. Information Technology Security Risk Assessment and Audit Services (“IT SRAA”)
    • To provide an information technology security risk assessment and audit on the entire system, including access control, data security, application security, network and communication security, etc., and arrange red team security test.
  4. Computer Audit Services
    • To provide a computer audit on the integrity of the entire automated counting process so as to ensure the BPCVS complies with all relevant requirements, and monitor the integrity, security and accuracy of the data in the BPCVS.
    • To audit the test plans, test specifications and test results submitted by both BPCVS Contractor and Independent Testing Services Contractor, and offer advice where necessary.
    • To review reports submitted by other independent quality assurance service providers and offer advice where necessary.
    • To monitor the whole counting process at the Central Counting Station.

The contractors of the four independent quality assurance services have completed all pre-production audit / testing on the BPCVS. Final system testing on the BPCVS will be conducted by the contractors at the production site at the Central Counting Station before formal operation of the Central Counting Station.